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A number of the terms and contrasts that we have seen are used to characterise legal 
meaning are in play here, alongside the semantically vague adjectives ‘right’ and 
‘appropriate’ (which cut across procedural, legal and moral vocabularies). Lord 
Neuberger’s conclusion was that building should be given ‘its natural and relatively wide 
meaning’, such that Mr Ghai’s wishes in relation to cremation could be accommodated 
within the relevant regulations. 
This approach may appear to make the interpretive process vague, especially as 
English courts are not obliged to repeat the construction of undefined words from 
earlier cases, or reflect how the same word is used in other areas of legislation (though 
they often do). The purpose of confining cremations within buildings differs in obvious 
ways from, for example, the aim of the Theft Act 1968 (where building is also defined 
and has been tested in numerous cases). The Theft Act highlights a combination of 
specificity and contextual variability required in legal construction of word mean­
ing. In s. 9(3), building is defined to include ‘an inhabited vehicle or vessel, and shall 
apply to any such vehicle or vessel at times when the person having habitation in it 
is not there as well as at times when he is in’. It is as much legal purpose as closeness 
to prototype that subsumes an uninhabited waterborne vessel within the meaning of 
building but still finds a partly sideless room with a roof problematic. 
Word meaning in context 
Reference in legal interpretation to purpose (e.g. as communicated by the long title of 
a legislative act; see Thread 3) is a reminder that although words function as 
concentrated nodes of meaning, they are shaded or modulated on any occasion of use 
by other factors. Those factors include: the other words around them (co-text); previous 
instances of the same word elsewhere in the same discourse; the situation in which 
they are used; and background knowledge likely to be drawn on by an interpreter. If 
we are to understand how word meanings are used and contested in legal settings, 
therefore, it is necessary to situate interpretive disputes in both the legislative text 
around the word and also in how we inevitably draw selectively on surrounding, 
contextual information. 
A7 THE VOCABULARY OF LEGAL POWER 
In this unit, we examine the relationship between language, law and power, a 
connection we touch on in different ways throughout the book. Here, we address the 
specific question whether legal concepts merely describe, actively give effect to, or 
obscure social power. First, we introduce two key concepts at the intersection between 
any society’s political and legal spheres: power and order. Then we explain why use of 
such words is difficult to disentangle when thinking about legal language. Finally, we 
examine how language use may suggest different possible relationships that law can 
create between power and order. 
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Power, order and law 
Law is often defined in terms of power and order. Both terms are polysemous: that is, 
they have various related senses. The multiple senses are used, and meaningful, in law 
in various ways; and this makes it potentially difficult to grasp fully how law is using 
them (because their meaning in a given context might involve one or other shading 
of meaning). The words power and order are prime examples of a general tendency in 
legal language: that while words appear to have precise senses, their meaning in a given 
context can only be gauged by understanding relations between some or all of the 
possible senses available. 
Consider power first, which is a highly abstract term. Power has been used and 
understood in many different ways in social science (e.g. as military, economic and 
political power) as well as in other contexts. In social relations, power signifies force 
or capability that confers an ability to influence situations, events or people. Often, 
such influence takes place without cooperation from relevant other actors. Capability 
to influence, accordingly, extends to authority, control and coercion. By a metonymic 
shift of meaning, in international relations the (now count noun) power means a 
country (or social group) considered to possess power in the other sense (e.g. an 
emerging power, regional power, great power or even superpower). 
For any such power or powers, the (uncountable) abstract resource, power, is built 
up in a number of ways: through ability to impose political will by military force; by 
commercial monopoly or supremacy; or by projected personal power ranging from 
charismatic leadership, symbolism and ritual through to direct domination and 
subordination of others. Some forms of power are in consequence ‘hard’, or coercive; 
others are ‘soft’, working by persuasion and influence. Operating in tandem with 
political and enforcement agencies, law exercises both hard and soft power: it imposes 
obligations backed by sanctions including imprisonment, bans and fines (and, in some 
countries, execution), and it gives effect to incentives, voluntary codes and other 
alternative regulatory measures. 
Now consider order and orders. Orders, in a narrow sense, are commands given by 
someone in a position of authority to bring about a change in a state of affairs perceived 
as not going in the right direction: a state of affairs not being in order, in a different 
but related sense of the term. The first of these senses of order has specific applications 
in law, being used to refer to legal decisions and documents such as court orders, formal 
orders and restraining orders. The second sense of order is different: it is the meaning 
present in social order and also found in the common phrase law and order. The 
meaning of this phrase can either denote a specific characteristic or condition of a 
society (one that has both law and order), or, confusingly, if the words are read 
together, then as a description of law being used to maintain or even create order: law 
brings about order by containing disorder. A still more abstract and neutral sense of 
order refers to how things are arranged, as in alphabetical order. And a further, related 
sense of the word, now with a positive connotation, refers to a system in which 
everything falls in the right place and seems to run satisfactorily by itself. 
Given this range of meanings, precisely what legal order means appears ambiguous. 
The phrase may be used to describe how law is organised (e.g. the international legal 
order). Rarely in academic publications but frequently in everyday usage, the phrase 
A7  32 I N T R O D U C T I O N :  K E Y  C O N C E P T S  
can alternatively carry ideological and moral content: the way things should be run as 
compared with the alternatives, for example in polemics concerned with imposing or 
restoring legal order. 
The concepts expressed by the words power and order often interact in discourse 
about politics and law. Consider the following sentence taken from the economic liberal 
thinker Friedrich Hayek (1978: 128): 
The effective limitation of power is the most important problem of social order. 
What this sentence means depends largely on tension created between the two 
contrasted words power and order; and contrast between the two terms is developed 
in the argument being made: that while government is indispensable in protecting a 
society against coercion and violence from others (by using power to maintain order), 
as soon as it acquires a monopoly over use of force (and so has too much unconstrained 
power), then government itself becomes a threat (to social order). As we will see below, 
law – specifically constitutional law – is often the mediator of tensions of this kind. 
Metalanguage of law and social organisation 
How law conceptualises the relation between power and order follows from the kind 
of social organisation in which a legal system is embedded. This is often reflected in 
the metalanguage used to talk about law. We can see this in three highly simplified 
forms of social organisation: 
1	 In some forms of social organisation, such as tyranny or despotism, the power of 
a sovereign may be unlimited (i.e. there is no clear constitutional order). While 
in some circumstances such social organisation might be thought desirable, in 
order to protect a population from war and fear (as in the analysis offered by the 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan; 2008 [1651]), the practical discourse 
of power adopted in such circumstances will consist of commands from a 
sovereign, and compliance, supplication and appeasement from everyone else. The 
ruling power need not always be an individual: authoritarian governments also 
present themselves under a shield of law. For example, the Nazi regime referred 
to their legal measures as ‘Gleichschaltung’ (meaning ‘synchronisation’, ‘bringing 
into line’, or ‘a forced kind of coordination’). From a contrasting perspective, Pedro 
Albizu Campos, leader of a Puerto Rican independence movement during the 
1930s, famously commented that ‘When tyranny is law, revolution is order’, 
critiquing what happens when power (both the count noun and the abstract 
resource) is presented falsely as law. 
2 In modern liberal democratic states, power is shared out by forms of political 
participation, including elections. Government power is constrained by a 
constitution: a body of law that defines the powers of and relationships between 
branches of government. The constitution of such states typically maintains a 
separation of powers between three branches of government (the executive, 
judiciary and legislative body), a separation believed to provide checks and balances 
preventing abuse by any one of these ‘powers’. In other words, in such societies, 
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law is used to structure political ‘power’ into a distinctive ‘order’. The rhetoric (or 
use of language) involved in law, in this perspective, aspires to be ‘socially 
constitutive’ in the manner envisaged by James Boyd White (see Unit D5): a two-
way traffic of ideas between specialised professional practice (involving legal 
training, rules and deliberation in particular cases) and a participative legal culture 
of explanation, debate and consultation. 
3 Marxist theories of law, by contrast, and a range of non-Marxist critical approaches 
influenced by them, conceive law differently. Law, in such frameworks, is a 
‘superstructure’ brought into existence by private possession of the means of 
production with its consequent division of society into classes. The two main social 
functions law then performs are accordingly to regulate relations of possession and 
to control the struggle between classes (Hirst 1979). Taking the form (in more 
recent European Marxist theories, such as the work of Althusser) of an ideological 
state apparatus supplementing repressive state powers including use of an army, 
law restates existing relations of production in the form of delegated powers and 
rights (especially property rights). In such legal restatement, it secures a structure 
of political domination. In order to rationalise social relations of power, legal uses 
of language in this context disguise economic and political inequality as equality 
under the law, mystifying the relationship that actually holds between power and 
population. 
The contrasts emphasised here highlight alternative ways in which uses of language 
to describe law translate different types and degrees of political power into what we 
recognise as legal systems, converting power into legal order. Language used to describe 
law is in this context therefore not just language describing law, but language managing 
a complex relationship between law and a wider ideological system from which such 
legal language must translate. 
The language of constitutions 
The general importance of the points made so far is that different social organisations 
are based on varying configurations of law, power and order. Many such configurations 
are specified in written or unwritten constitutions, which prescribe how political 
power will be channelled into, and stated as, the legal system. Some countries (including 
the UK) have no written constitution, but consider themselves nevertheless to have 
one in the sense of a set of principles performing the same function. Where a 
constitution is a written document, or group of documents, it sets out what are 
regarded to be fundamental principles of its form of government. The constitution, 
sometimes described by a different rubric such as basic law, may prescribe how rulers 
are chosen and how they can be called to account or removed. It may also regulate the 
behaviour of the main political actors; and it may indicate what rights an individual 
has against abuse of power (see Adler 2007). Such constitutions are legal instruments 
promulgated at particular historical moments, often following a political upheaval such 
as a revolution, civil war, or decolonisation. Once ratified, however, a constitution will 
typically have entrenched status; this means it can only be properly amended or 
repealed by some special procedure. 
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From a linguistic perspective, what makes constitutions interesting is that providing 
a framework for even the most basic principles underpinning the structure and 
purposes of a whole society calls for a great deal of detail. Article 1 of the US Bill of 
Rights (signed 1789, ratified 1791) suggests that some sections may be conceived in 
this way: 
After the first enumeration required by the first article of the Constitution, there shall be 
one Representative for every 30,000 until the number shall amount to 100, after which 
the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than 100 
Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every 40,000 persons, until the 
number of Representatives shall amount to 200; after which the proportion shall . . . 
Alongside highly specified measures of this kind (whose precise quantification 
nevertheless distracts from how contextually influenced the figures inevitably were), 
other measures are expressed in very broad terms. Contrast Article 1 above, for 
example, with Article 3, generally known as the First Amendment: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Each phrase of this article calls for (and has received) close scrutiny, not least because 
measures of this second type raise difficult problems of interpretation concerned first 
with how general they are, and second with how far they do or should reflect the 
thinking and values of the period in which they were written, despite being intended 
to remain in force for an open-ended future period. 
Faced with major interpretive challenges of many kinds, the field of constitutional 
law in any given society queries and interrogates, as well as states, that country’s legal 
form of organisation. An apex court such as the US Supreme Court must combine 
these two processes in judgments that clarify constitutive rules that distribute power 
within the society (of the kind illustrated above: ‘there shall be one Representative for 
every 30,000’) while ensuring that the society’s regulative rules are complied with (e.g. 
‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion’). Interpreted and 
reinterpreted in case law, the US Constitution – to take this pre-eminent example – 
has prompted an accumulating record (a ‘living document’) of arguments exploring 
fundamental questions concerned with the intentions, presumptions and general 
meanings represented by written constitutional words. 
Constitutions, commands and rules 
Constitutional arguments and decisions are a public process through which law engages 
with and dispenses political power, while also limiting power according to the principles 
of a distinct legal order. That process may be contrasted with what happens in most 
legal disputes, which are not concerned with testing the constitutive rules of a legal 
system, but more narrowly with applying its provisions. These two processes engage 
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different aspects of power and require different powers. Critical approaches to law tend 
to emphasise law’s closeness to singular, homogeneous power. But most statutes and 
legal procedures are concerned with plural powers: compartmentalised packets of 
delegated authority and duty conferred on and exercised by different legal actors (e.g. 
police officers, bailiffs, judges, etc.). 
All this makes the functioning of language in law harder to comprehend, partly 
because of the roles played by polysemy and vagueness in many of the keywords 
involved. Something of what order signifies, for example, that power does not, is a 
reconstruction of coercive power into a system of social regulation observing the rule 
of law (a principle subject to divergent interpretations but often functionally contrasted 
with the ‘rule of man’). 
Nor does the effect of different uses of keywords in law end with power and order. 
Introducing the idea of the ‘rule’ of law in fact extends the semantic task, because 
implementing the ‘rule of law’ will only involve ‘rules’ if rules are how law works (since 
rule, as a general social condition, may be exercised either by a ruler who issues 
commands or by one who follows rules). Rule and order can both denote states of affairs, 
or ‘systems’, or they can mean what people do to influence the actions of others (as 
those others carry out commands or comply with general instructions). It is almost 
impossible to extricate law’s relationship with power and order from conceptual 
problems inherent in the terminology involved. Yet beyond the questions of 
terminology, how power is exercised in language also depends on how, in practice, rules, 
commands and orders operate. 
REGULATION OF LANGUAGE USE A8 
In this unit, we switch to a different perspective on language and law: how language 
used in situations other than ‘legal’ contexts – in general communication – is treated 
if it becomes the subject matter of litigation. Examples of when this happens include 
cases of alleged bribery, harassment, trademark infringement, insulting or abusive 
verbal behaviour, defamation, and actions in a number of other fields. How language 
is treated in such circumstances differs from interpretation of statutes (where the 
language was drafted in anticipation of being read according to legal norms). It also 
differs from how oral or written evidence is treated in court (because the significance 
of evidential language lies primarily in what is reported rather than in effects on an 
addressee or other person of what is being expressed). In the ‘general language’ 
situations we now discuss, the main legal focus is on the meaning and effects of 
communication in the field of regulated public behaviour. 
Communications in trouble 
To begin, we outline the many ways in which verbal communication gets into trouble 
with the law, either by constituting criminal behaviour (i.e. where prosecution may 
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